Bargaining in a Video Experiment: Determinants of Boundedly by Heike Hennig-Schmidt

By Heike Hennig-Schmidt

Bilateral bargaining events are of serious value in truth. conventional microeconomics, even if, make cognitive and motivational assumptions of matters` complete rationality which are printed as being unrealistic by means of more and more experimental investigations. the current publication provides a huge contribution to the certainty of ideas of boundedly rational habit through without delay staring at teams of matters in a call scenario and videotaping their discussions. an important results of the ebook is that the habit of topics is guided by means of aspirations in regards to the ultimate end result. the degrees of aspirations are stimulated by way of prominence and diverse types of the fairness precept leading to numerous equity norms as to the allocation of the amount of cash to be divided. one other vital characteristic of the booklet stems from the research of holiday off discussions and permits a motivational clarification of the emergence of breakdowns in bargaining.

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Middle between Proportional and Equal Split (MPES) The coalition value is split such that both groups receive a payoff according to the middle between Proportional and Equal Split. Thus in our experiment Ps = v(l) + tv(12) and Pw = v(2) + tV(12); the values for MPES and Split the Difference are the same. 18Payoffs of S-groups will be denoted by Ps, payoffs of W-groups by Pw. v(l2)-v(l)-v(2) 2v(l) _ v(l2) 2 SO MPES MSOES v(l2) ES 2 v(l) - v(2) (SO - ES) / 2 v(l2) P r = v(l) + v(2) v(l) + v(2) 2 1 - 2 2 1 2 4 v(l) - v(2) 4 2.

1 Bargaining Models and Related Experiments Bargaining is a frequent type of social interaction in real world settings. Therefore it is not surprising that not only economists but also social psychologists are interested in phenomena that characterize bargaining situations. Gruder (1970) gives a concise description of the situation bargainers are confronted with in a negotiation process that points out the main features of our experiment: The goal of the participants in a bargaining situation is to reach some agreement as how to devide between themselves the total outcome from their relationship, in our experiment the coalition value of 320 points.

10, Rheinberg, 1995, p. 14). e. a subject will take that decision which, given the constraints of the situation, will yield the maximal payoff. And the controversy in interpreting the results of ultimatum bargaining centers on whether these outcomes can be explained within the framework of game theory assuming that fully rational players are only motivated by economic or whether also noneconomic factors have to be taken into account. The videotapes reveal that noneconomic motivations, norms and emotions are of decisive influence on the behavior of subjects.

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