Computer organization and design 4th ed solutions manual by David A. Patterson, John L. Hennessy

By David A. Patterson, John L. Hennessy

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Computer Vision – ACCV 2007: 8th Asian Conference on Computer Vision, Tokyo, Japan, November 18-22, 2007, Proceedings, Part II

The 2 quantity set LNCS 4843 and LNCS 4844 constitutes the refereed lawsuits of the eighth Asian convention on machine imaginative and prescient, ACCV 2007, held in Tokyo, Japan, in November 2007. The forty six revised complete papers, three planary and invited talks, and one hundred thirty revised poster papers of the 2 volumes have been conscientiously reviewed and seleceted from 551 submissions.

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LNCS, vol. 3506, pp. 33–50. html 6. pdf 7. : Cryptanalysis of Stream Ciphers with Linear Masking. In: Yung, M. ) CRYPTO 2002. LNCS, vol. 2442, pp. 515–532. Springer, Heidelberg (2002) 8. : Higher Order Correlation Attacks, XL Algorithm and Cryptanalysis of Toyocrypt. , Lim, C. ) ICISC 2002. LNCS, vol. 2587, pp. 182–199. Springer, Heidelberg (2003) 9. : Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers with Overdefined Systems of Equations. In: Zheng, Y. ) ASIACRYPT 2002. LNCS, vol. 2501, pp. 267–287. Springer, Heidelberg (2002) 10.

Note that the achieved autocorrelation of 24 is the lowest currently known for balanced functions of this size. The s-boxes were created using heuristic techniques. Existing methods [18] were adopted to generate individual boolean functions. These were compared to the existing s-box functions and the above-listed requirements were checked for the XOR pairs. Acceptable candidate functions were appended to the s-box. Otherwise, the function was discarded and another function created and tested. 1) allows the non-linearity of the boolean functions producing the output bits of G and H to be calculated exactly from S1 and S2 .

After the initialization process, we expect that any difference in the keys/IVs would not result in biased keystream. 4 Randomness of the Keystream Our initial analysis shows that the distinguishing attack on HC-128 requires more than 2128 outputs. The analysis is given below. Recall that if, at the i-th step, (i mod 1024) < 512, table P is updated as: P [i mod 512] = P [i mod 512] + g1 (P [i 3], P [i 10], P [i 511]) The Stream Cipher HC-128 43 We know that si = h1 (P [i 12]) ⊕ P [i mod 512]. For 10 ≤ (i mod 1024) < 511, this feedback function can be written alternatively as: si ⊕ h1 (zi ) = (si−1024 ⊕ h1 (zi−1024 )) + g1 (si−3 ⊕ h1 (zi−3 ), si−10 ⊕ h1 (zi−10 ), si−1023 ⊕ h1 (zi−1023 )) (1) where h1 (x) and h1 (x) indicate two different functions since they are related to different S-boxes; zj denotes P [j 12] at the j-th step.

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